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Abstract 
Since the burst of the recent global financial crisis, credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) and their rating process in financial markets and international developments 
has been a subject of great controversy. Rating agencies are considered to have 
contributed to this economic recession and huge European debt crisis, by upgrading or 
downgrading country economies, banks and their derivatives, either due to 
incompetence, questionable methodologies or serving certain personal and financial 
players’ interests. Banks, while constituting the basis of global finance, are receiving 
the credit ratings of the famous agencies and as a result their personal investment and 
financing decisions, clients, investors and characteristics in general are affected by 
them.   
A brief and comprehensive summary is firstly conducted referring to their 
historical background, functions and evolving role through the last century in order to 
provide crucial information on their growing and evolution from simple statistical 
organizations to financial giants affecting global economy. Moreover, an analysis of 
the quantitative determinants of credit ratings is conducted, based on the banks of five 
European countries, widely known in the world of finance as PIIGS. Bank-specific 
characteristics, such as credit risk, size, liquidity, profitability, efficiency and capital 
adequacy, are the main aspects of credit rating determinants that are going to be 
examined in this study.  
This study constitutes an examination of the hotly debated issue of credit rating 
agencies and an effort to provide information on an area in finance that is quite 
unknown to the public. Certain conclusions are finally reached regarding the bank 
credit rating process and its methodology in relation with the strong arguments about 
the lack of creditworthiness and value of the agencies as statistical and financial 
organizations.      
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their 
actual role in financial markets and international developments has been a subject of 
great controversy. Rumors, debates and scenarios about conflicts of interests and 
games under the table are continuously enhanced. Rating agencies are considered to 
have contributed to the current economic recession and huge European debt crisis, by 
upgrading or downgrading country economies, banks and their derivatives, either due 
to incompetence, questionable methodologies or serving certain personal and financial 
players’ interests. Banks, while constituting the basis of global finance, are receiving 
the credit ratings of the famous agencies and as a result their personal investment and 
financing decisions, clients, investors and characteristics in general are affected by 
them (Ulinski and Girasa, 2011). Liquidity, efficiency, profitability and operating 
problems have been widely revealed in the banking sector since the burst of the global 
recession, undermining the credit rating and raising several research questions. Have 
rating agencies properly evaluated European banks in their reports, since the period 
when the first signs of the economic crisis were shown up until now? Are credit rating 
agencies and their evaluations valuable and trustworthy? Which determinants and 
criteria should be used in their rating methodologies? These are some of the basic 
questions that this study examines and tries to provide proper explanations.  
In this effort, for answering and understanding the abovementioned remarks, an 
analysis is performed of the evolving role of the agencies since their establishment 
and the quantitative determinants of bank ratings for European banks whose countries 
have succumbed to a severe debt crisis over the last years. Specifically, the banks of 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Greece are examined since these five country 
economies, known as the PIIGS
1
, are heavily indebted and perceived as either impetus 
or victims of the crisis. The rating process of these European banks is taken into 
account over the last years, before and after the crisis, in order to conclude to some 
                                                          
1 The term has been used since the mid-1990s regarding Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece due to their 
similar socioeconomic environments and credit default as a result of the crisis. Using the euro as their currency, 
they were unable to apply the proper monetary policy in order to recover from the economic recession.  
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explanatory and rational assumptions about the actual methodologies and criteria of 
the CRAs applied in troublesome cases. 
Terms and concepts, such as rating agencies, (the famous Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch), upgrading or downgrading of banks and credit risk rating, 
familiar only to people in finance, and not the public, about ten years ago, are now 
part of  everyday life. People’s lives have dramatically changed over the last few 
years. The global economic recession has significantly affected the European 
economy; most of its countries have constantly received negative criticism on their 
credit quality, mainly coming from the agencies and their credit ratings that evaluate 
countries and banks, resulting in the huge sovereign debt crisis. Severe monetary 
measures and methods were applied by governments in order to recover from the 
terrible losses of the financial and economic chaos created. This situation, just 
described, is an interesting and current issue of great controversy that one should get 
the chance to be informed on, since credit rating agencies have brought themselves to 
light and affect each one’s life, especially people in countries who are in serious  
financial trouble, such as the PIIGS.  
This study can be of great utility to anyone in finance, especially amateurs or 
other students starting to deal with global economic matters, since a scientific, 
econometric, but rather simple approach is performed in order to provide answers and 
explanations of the rating agencies evaluation and technique determinants and criteria 
in their rating methodologies. A fundamental and crucial point of this study is the 
examination of the quantitative determinants of credit rating processes performed by 
the agencies, whether they are rational and significant in their interpretation or not and 
conclude to the amount of credibility and trustworthiness the notorious rating 
agencies can provide to the public. Qualitative criteria due to their difficulty in being 
quantified and taken into account in econometric and financial studies are not used in 
this research. Credit rating evaluation is not a simple procedure based entirely on solid 
numerical facts and as a result it is quite improbable concluding to a certain 
unquestionable result since the quantitative aspect of the whole rating procedure is 
only taken into consideration. Nevertheless, useful and comprehensive results can be 
deduced from this econometric study providing a clear and solid picture of the banks’ 
characteristics playing an important role in the final rating evaluation performed by 
the agencies. Apart from the mere quantitative research of this study, a summary 
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report is also performed on the historical background and evolving role of credit 
rating agencies since the beginning of their operations until the present. 
1.2 Historical background   
The bond rating industry celebrated its 100th birthday a few years ago. Credit 
rating agencies were created in the early 1900s to provide information on the credit 
quality of bonds first in the railroad industry, and then for utilities and industrials 
(Purda, 2011).Rating agencies have reported on the creditworthiness of financial 
instruments and publicly traded companies since then, helping market participants 
make rational and circumstantial investment decisions (Sack and Juris, 2007).John 
Moody, in 1909, was the first to issue publicly available bond ratings. Poor’s 
Publishing appeared then in the rating industry in 1916; Standard Statistics followed 
in 1922. The two companies merged in 1941, forming S&P, which was absorbed by 
McGraw-Hill in 1966. In 1924, Fitch Publishing also appeared in the industry (White, 
2007). Today, there are ten nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
(NRSRO) that financial firms may use for regulatory purposes by the U.S. SEC
2
 
(Ulinski and Girasa, 2011). The major ratings agencies in the United States are still 
the first three that made their appearance in the early 1990’s, Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s, and Fitch, dominating the rating industry and financial markets. 
The utility of the ratings companies for investors was obvious: the ratings 
provided more opinions of expertise for bond investors as far as the credit risk and 
quality of companies is concerned. Consistent with this view, the typical business 
model at first was for the rating agencies to sell their assessments and risk evaluations 
to investors. During the 1930s, the first major change appeared that had a significant 
impact on the industry. Bank regulators began to comment on the integrity and 
soundness of banks based on the quality of the corporate bonds in which the banks 
had invested; quality as evaluated by the rating agencies. By 1936, they had settled on 
a standard requirement, which is still in effect nowadays that banks could not invest in 
bonds that were below investment grade; the BBB rating is considered to be the 
“boundary” of an investment grade bond according to the grading scales and 
                                                          
2 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (frequently abbreviated SEC) is a federal agency which holds 
primary responsibility for enforcing the federal securities laws and regulating the securities industry, the nation's 
stock and options exchanges, and other electronic securities markets in the United States. The SEC was established 
by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934 as an independent, regulatory organization during the 
Great Depression that followed the Crash of 1929. 
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definitions provided by the major agencies which were at the time and still are in 
force (White, 2007).  
The rating industry came across its second main modification in the early 1970s, 
when the business model applied among agencies, investors and corporations changed 
from the “investor-pays” model to an “issuer-pays” one. Rating agencies began 
charging issuers of debt rather than investors for their services. Several possible 
explanations are provided for the evolution of the business model from an investor-
pays to an issuer-pays one, such as the expanding use of the photocopier enabling the 
quick and easy circulation of ratings to anyone interested in, the bankruptcy of Penn-
Central Railroad shocking bond markets and the fact that issuers of debt were eager to 
pay rating agencies so as to reassure investors of their creditworthiness. As a result, 
no matter the reasoning behind this business model alteration, the movement to an 
issuer-pays model caused the close interaction of agencies and issuers throughout the 
credit rating process (Purda, 2011). The other major change of the rating industry 
occurred during the 1970s.The SEC proposed that investors should be subject to 
minimum capital requirements and these requirements be linked to the credit risk of 
the bonds held in their investment portfolios. Under this whole scenery of bonds, 
ratings and capital requirements, a question of reliability, integrity and rights of the 
organizations providing the ratings arose. Since the SEC wanted to use bond ratings 
as the basis for those quality determinations, a decision was taken by the SEC to 
create a new category aiming at the establishment of a powerful regulatory system: 
The nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) were created 
(White, 2007). The SEC recognized only four additional firms as NRSROs in the 
years that passed up to 2000, reaching today the final number of ten as mentioned. 
1.3 Functions   
The definition of a rating remains almost unchanged since the beginning of the 
rating industry in the previous century. According to Standard and Poor’s, ratings 
“express opinions about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a 
corporation, state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in accordance 
with the terms of those obligations” or under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a 
credit rating is defined as “an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an 
entity or with respect to specific securities or money market instrument” (Purda, 
2011). CRAs provide opinions on the potential bankruptcy or expected losses of 
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companies, governments and a wide variety of financial products. Probability of 
default includes the measurement of credit risk, whereas other risks, such as exchange 
rate, currency or interest rate risk, are not included by the assessments (Johansson, 
2010). The three major rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, use 
their own methodology and apply different techniques, but all of them agree on a 
letter scale notation regarding credit risk. Under Fitch and S&P’s rating scale, for 
instance, AAA is the best rating possible, with investments between AAA and BBB 
regarded as “investment” grade. The lower grades provide indications of volatile and 
risky investments, the lowest of which widely considered to be “junk” or “toxic” 
(Sack and Juris, 2007). The general meaning of credit ratings is summarized below. 
 
Table 1: Summary of credit rating scale 
  S&P’s Moody’s Fitch 
 Investment Grade 
 Superior financial security - Highest safety AAA Aaa AAA 
Excellent financial security - Highly safe AA Aa AA 
Good financial security - More susceptible to economic 
changes than highly rated companies 
 
 
A A A 
Adequate financial security - More vulnerable to 
economic changes than highly rated companies 
BBB Baa BBB 
 Non-Investment grade 
 Financial security may be adequate, but capacity to meet 
long-term policies is vulnerable 
BB Ba BB 
Vulnerable financial security B B B 
Extremely vulnerable financial security- Questionable 
ability to meet obligations unless favorable conditions 
prevail 
CCC Caa CCC 
Very high levels of credit risk - Default of some kind 
appears probable 
CC Ca CC 
Regulatory action - Placed under an order of rehabilitation 
and liquidation 
C C C 
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Credit rating agencies, by means of the ratings, act as intermediaries regarding 
information asymmetries between financial players such as issuers, investors and 
regulators. Providing information is, hence, one of the main functions of CRAs. 
Moreover, a CRA can serve as a certification body in relation to rating regulation, 
meaning that the rating is regarded as an official seal of approval. Finally, ratings 
contribute to standardization, reducing, as a result, possible problems caused by 
different rules and cultures on controversy (Johansson, 2010). 
1.4 Conflicts of interest   
A risk for conflicts of interest exists at several stages of the rating procedures 
deriving from either the relationship between the CRA and the issuer or that between 
the employee and the issuer. When the CRAs implemented the issuer-pays model, the 
soundness of the rating might have be affected by the interest of producing new 
business, specifically when assessing structured finance products due to the high 
concentration of participants and the significant revenues from these ratings. 
Nevertheless, it should be highlighted, that alternative payment techniques are not 
flawless; in an investor-pays model, the investors are aiming at a low rating so as to 
receive a higher return and publicly financed ratings might deal with similar problems 
as the governments are keen on making certain that a high rating is provided for 
corporations that play an important role inside domestic economies. Except for such 
kind of conflicts, there is also a potential risk for conflicts of interest deriving from 
the personal needs and ambitions of CRA employees. The independence of an 
employee could, for instance, be affected if they are compensated for their 
contribution to the company’s profits, have any ownership or other kind of economic 
or personal influence in the rated entity or are allowed to ask for and receive any kind 
of reward from the rated entity. However, such types of conflicts have slightly arisen 
following the crisis and it appears as if they have been properly controlled, if needed, 
by the CRAs and their employees (Johansson, 2010). 
1.5 Regulation of credit rating agencies   
Before the crucial time period of 2008 and the burst of the economic recession, 
there was restricted regulation of CRAs and a general conception and dependence on 
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the strength of market forces, such as the reputation mechanism
3
. Nevertheless, the 
financial crisis has provoked a reforming of the regulatory system and a change in the 
issue of public intervention. IOSCO is an international organization of securities 
regulators, aiming at maintaining fair, efficient and opaque financial markets, 
promoting economic development and establishing proper regulation of international 
transactions of the great variety of financial instruments and products. Their first 
report and set of principles referring to CRAs were presented in 2003. A more 
analytical code of behavior was issued in 2004, known as the Code, revised in May 
2008 due to the financial crisis (Johansson, 2010). IOSCO’s Statement of Principles 
Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies (2003) and Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (2004) claim four aspects of voluntary 
principles for rating agencies to adopt and act on accordingly: “Emphasis was given 
on quality and integrity of the rating process, independence and avoidance of 
conflicts of interest, raise of a feeling of public responsibility towards investors-
issuers and public disclosure of their own code of behavior”. However, government 
regulation of rating agencies was not included and rating agencies were not forced or 
threatened in any way to comply with the code of conduct by IOSCO or any other 
international regulatory organization. In response to the role of rating agencies 
following the recent financial mess, IOSCO revised the Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies in 2008 by reinforcing each of the four 
categories of principles. There were measures included so as to strengthen each of the 
aspects covered by the set of principles in 2003 and 2004, such as “ensuring adequate 
monitoring and timeliness of ratings, prohibiting analysts from participating in the 
design of structured securities and increasing public disclosures” (Katz et al., 2009).  
1.6 General remarks  
The agencies underestimated the credit risk related to structured credit products 
and didn’t manage to adjust their ratings quickly enough as financial markets and 
worldwide economies in general were deteriorating. CRAs were to blame for both 
methodology errors and conflicts of interests still in progress, contributing to the 
market participants’ loss of confidence in the creditworthiness of ratings. It is not a 
shock certainly, regarding this whole negative situation and unfavorable market 
                                                          
3 Widely known as a technique for building trust and promoting the cooperation in online marketplaces, such as 
eBay, these mechanisms are balanced to have a wider impact on organizations. 
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conditions, for a heated debate to rise about the rating process, rating agencies, 
competition, and liability rules, enhancing the government and public demand for 
greater regulation and monitoring of CRAs (Utzig, 2010). 
The Dodd-Frank Act
4
 significantly changes the frame wherein CRAs act. They 
will no longer have the right to claim almost unlimited liability from lawsuits from 
investors and others who rely on credit ratings provided by them. They will be 
considered responsible for; regarding accountants, lawyers and other professionals 
whose expertise remarks may force them to undergo any legal action taken by people 
affected by them. Banks and CRAs have to present publicly from now on more 
information on the rating process. Banks, in specific, are required to reveal all initial 
ratings received so as to prevent any potential cooperation between them. CRAs must 
also reveal more information about past ratings so that investors can decide on their 
relative performance. The expansion of CRAs, dominated by the major three 
organizations of S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch, should contribute at least to the 
improvement of the ratings’ accuracy. The Dodd-Frank Act aims at enabling CRAs to 
interact with banks in a more reliable, transparent and opaque manner (Ulinski and 
Girasa, 2011). 
                                                          
4 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act came into force by President Barack Obama 
on July 21, 2010. Serving as a reply to the late-2000s recession, it introduced the most significant changes to 
financial regulation in the United States since the regulatory reform that followed the Great Depression. 
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2. Literature Review 
Numerous studies have focused and dealt with the controversial case of credit 
rating agencies and their ratings regarding the credit risk of sovereign entities or 
corporations. Sovereign entities, such as a national government, have mainly been 
examined and analyzed by most financial researchers, scientists and market players 
for a great period of time. However, corporate credit ratings regarding the credit risk 
of a certain instrument of the corporation, rather than the whole corporation, have 
only been a subject of analysis for the last decades, from the end of the previous 
century until the present. Existing literature in ratings criteria and determinants mainly 
concentrates on sovereign ratings, including political and several others types of risk. 
This study is an example of a corporate credit rating analysis, focusing on the banking 
sector in particular and the long term issuer rating provided by the credit rating 
agencies. Despite the fact of the limited examination of bank ratings, an adequate and 
satisfying amount of researchers have dealt with this issue, providing the necessary 
feedback and literature. 
Emawtee Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Sirimon Treepongkaruna (2011) 
performed a quantitative research of the determinants of bank ratings for the banking 
sector in the United Kingdom and Australia. Both long and short term ratings 
provided by the three major rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, 
were the case of their econometric analysis. They studied which determinants play a 
significant role in the rating agencies’ methodologies and models, concluding to the 
reliability, value and impartiality of the rating evaluation procedures. Specifically, 
financial ratios and indicators regarding asset quality, liquidity, capital adequacy and 
profitability performance were the main independent variables examined in their 
model. Non-performing loans, total capital ratio, liquid assets to total assets and return 
on assets prove to be significant determinants across the rating agencies’ models and 
techniques, whereas macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and gross domestic 
product (GDP), do not appear to contribute to determining the bank ratings. 
Winnie P.H. Poon et al. (1999) performed a multivariate analysis of the 
determinants of Moody’s bank financial strength ratings. Their econometric analysis 
tested the safety and soundness of banks for over 50 countries examining mainly 
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bank-specific accounting and financial characteristics. Variables of risk dimensions, 
loan provision and profitability ratios all prove to significantly contribute to the 
financial strength ratings, whereas country risk ratings don’t have a significant 
impact, providing another sign that key determinants of bank ratings are mainly bank-
specific characteristics and general market or country indicators play a less important 
role. Bank financial strength ratings (BFSR) were an alternative type of rating that 
Moody’s introduced, besides the traditional long-term debt rating (LTDR), long and 
short-term deposit rating and other bank credit ratings. Nevertheless, similar 
accounting and financial variables are taken into account for the estimation of all 
these types of ratings focusing on bank-specific characteristics, such as profitability, 
operating, liquidity and efficiency indicators and ratios. 
Anatoly Peresetsky and Alexander Karminsky (2008) undertook a project of 
studying the long-term deposit and bank financial strength ratings of Moody’s, 
performing an econometric analysis based on bank characteristics, time dummies and 
country-specific variables. Apart from the typical quantitative research of bank-
specific characteristics, an attempt was made to test the external support factors that 
Moody’s might take into consideration in assessing deposit ratings and which 
macroeconomic factors are significant. Profitability, liquidity and loan provision were 
taken into account as major and vital bank characteristics, whereas macroeconomic 
factors, such as inflation or gross domestic product were neglected or proved to be 
insignificant. However, an interesting finding of corruption revealing its significance 
in model evaluation came in the spotlight. Country corruption, as assessed and 
provided by the Corruption Perceptions Index
5
, which infests numerous governments 
around the globe, highly affects rating agencies in their credit rating models as shown 
in this study, since banks in countries with higher levels of levels of corruption, tend 
to receive lower credit ratings. 
Credit rating determinants were also studied by Guglielmo Maria Caporale et al. 
(2012), regarding the bank ratings provided by Fitch Ratings. The focus of this 
econometric study, based on ordered choice models, was the analysis of Fitch’s 
individual ratings, a certain type of the four categories of ratings that the organization 
provides to issuers. Bank-specific characteristics were also used as financial variables 
                                                          
5 Since 1995, Transparency International (TI) publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) annually ranking 
countries "by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys." The 
CPI defines corruption as "the misuse of public power for private benefit." As of 2010, the CPI ranks 178 countries 
on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
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of the model, including total assets, net interest margin, return on equity, liquid to 
total assets ratio, operating expenses and non-performing loans. The interesting part 
of this analysis was the examination of country-specific factors by incorporating a 
country index.  Overall ratings appear to reflect a bank’s financial position, however 
liquidity and net interest margin appeared to be rather insignificant in the test results 
for determining and affecting credit ratings. As far as the country index is concerned, 
there is strong evidence of affecting bank ratings such that banks in some countries 
have systematically higher ratings than others. However, an important thing to be 
mentioned is that inclusion of the country aspect raises the possibility of a model to 
predict with accuracy bank ratings relative to models that exclude country effects. 
This suggests that international studies attempting to predict ratings, and not just 
identifying determinants, have to include country indices in their models.  
Fotios Pasiouras et al. (2006) studied the impact of bank regulation, supervision 
and market structure on bank ratings, apart from the traditional bank-specific 
characteristics in all similar analysis. Data from the sample used and the Fitch 
individual bank ratings showed that banks with higher profitability, liquidity and 
efficiency performance receive higher credit ratings, whereas problems and 
inadequacy among these crucial performance aspects tend to provoke the 
downgrading of banks. As far as regulation and supervision are concerned, which are 
expressed through capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, disciplinary 
power, auditing and entry requirements and economic freedom seem to play an 
important role in rating models and procedures. Market structure variables, such as 
the percentage of banks owned by governments or foreign owned, also prove to be 
quite significant when examined in credit rating assessment. 
Frank Packer and Nikola Tarashev (2011) perform a general evaluation of the 
rating methodologies of the three major credit rating agencies and make a comparison 
of them before and after the 2008 financial crisis. No econometric models are 
presented in order to examine certain quantitative determinants and factors of the 
bank ratings. A descriptive analysis is rather made of the grading scales and 
methodologies of each agency and the upgrading or downgrading of banks across 
countries with the financial crisis serving as a benchmark for the necessary 
comparisons. The difficulties in assessing banks’ credibility and trustworthiness are 
highlighted due to the external support banks need, systematic or market risk and 
volatile earnings’ performance that have to be accounted for. Nowadays, the credit 
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rating agencies seem to reevaluate their methodologies and reconsider certain aspects 
of their rating procedures and techniques. Differences in their methodologies 
contribute also to the difficulty in assessing a bank’s creditworthiness.  Numerous and 
complex factors and criteria matter for each of the agencies not enabling a firm and 
dominant model or framework. 
Nicholas Apergis et al. (2011) performed an analysis of credit ratings and 
performance indicators regarding the banking sector. The innovative aspect of this 
study was the examination of the impact of the credit rating changes on banks’ certain 
variables rather than the impact of these variables on the credit ratings. Nevertheless, 
the variables and indicators used and examined in their study as dependent variables, 
constitute the independent ones in this research, proving the interesting and interactive 
relationship of bank credit ratings and bank-specific characteristics. Once more, 
common profitability, liquidity and efficiency ratios were used in their econometric 
analysis, examining their significant changes through time due to the corresponding 
upgrading or downgrading provided by the credit rating agencies. 
Another interesting study regarding credit rating agencies and banks’ 
creditworthiness was performed by Antonio Di Cesare (2006). An analysis is made 
concerning market-based indicators, such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads, bond 
spreads and stock prices regarding their ability to anticipate the decisions of rating 
agencies. The quantitative research of determinants on bank ratings is also not 
conducted, similarly to the study of Nicholas Apergis mentioned before, mainly 
focusing on the impact of credit ratings on other market-based aspects and 
characteristics of the banking sector. It constitutes an alternative approach on the issue 
of credit ratings and bank performance, reinforcing the general statement and belief of 
the complexity of the credit rating procedures and difficulty in assessing banks’ 
creditworthiness due to the several factors and aspects of micro or macro-indicators, 
bank-specific characteristics, systematic risk and market structure nature accounted 
for. 
An important comment, contributing to the literature of this study, has to be 
made on Stefan Boes and Rainer Winkelman (2006) in their study about advances in 
statistical analysis. The ordered response model, based on an underlying latent model 
with single index function and constant thresholds, is the regression model being used 
in this study in order to conclude to the significant financial variables affecting and 
determining credit ratings. 
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Last, but not least, as far as the theoretical approach of credit rating agencies is 
concerned, several studies and publications have contributed to the presentation and 
pointing out of the most important aspects of the rating agencies’ background and 
framework. Tobias Johansson (2010) and Lynnette D. Purda (2011) conducted 
interesting studies about the evolving role of rating agencies throughout the years, 
providing important and meaningful facts about the background of the agencies, their 
initial working framework and their evolving functions and rating process until the 
present. Moreover, Siegfried Utzig (2010), Michael Ulinski and Roy Girasa (2011) in 
their working papers dealt with the controversial issue of rating agencies, emphasizing 
on the regulatory aspect of the story and need for several reforms due to the conflicts 
of interest provoked and general turmoil under the recent financial crisis. 
The study performed in this paper is a quantitative research on the determinants 
of long-term issuer rating concerning the banking sector. Countries that have 
succumbed to the 2008 financial crisis, such as the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain), and their banks are the main focus of the econometric analysis to 
be followed, due to their severe downgrading following the global recession. Lower 
credit ratings should be explained at a certain level by bank-specific determinants and 
the abovementioned literature contributes to the decision and examination of specific 
key financial and accounting variables serving as credit rating determinants.  
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3. Methodology   
3.1 Modeling framework  
The study of the quantitative determinants of the credit ratings is based on an 
ordered probit regression model rather than following a classic ordinary least squares 
approach (OLS) which is commonly applied in econometric finance problems. The 
most powerful benefit of using linear regression is that it leads to easy, simple and 
applicable mathematical theory. This strength should not be ignored and, in many 
cases, this reasoning alone is good enough for linearity to be utilized. However, as 
attractive as its strengths might be, linear regression has very strict assumptions that 
cannot be violated. Unreasonable conclusions can be reached when the assumption of 
linearity is made on a dataset that does not support this assumption. There are many 
restrictions in the linear regression area of research (Brooks, 2008). Apart from the 
fact that a linear model isn’t always the most appropriate relationship, the violation of 
one or more theoretical assumptions can lead to irrational and inapplicable results. If a 
model's error structure is in fact multiplicative rather than additive, using linear 
regression assumes that the error has constant variance when this is not true. This can 
lead to misestimating the standard error, thus giving extreme values of prediction 
bounds. Another common violation is the necessity of the errors to be normally 
distributed. The assumption of error’s normal distribution is of crucial importance to 
the theory development. This violation is common and can alter or weaken the 
theoretical solutions. When these theoretical assumptions do not hold, factors, 
estimates and prediction bounds cannot be regarded as trustworthy due to the fact that 
they are biased or misleading (Feldman, 2009). 
In statistics, ordered probit is a generalization of the analysis to the case of more 
than two outcomes of an ordinal dependent variable. The ordered probit’s modeling 
framework choice has been made on the general theory applied to dependent variables 
of a discrete and ordinal nature such as credit ratings. Ordinal numbers can be 
interpreted as providing a position or an ordering. A number of 12 for an ordinal scale 
may be viewed as better than a number of 6, but could definitely not be considered 
twice as good. Examples of ordinal numbers would be the position of a runner in a 
race, for instance, second place is better than fourth one, but it would be pointless to 
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consider it twice as good, a level reached in a computer game or in the case studied a 
credit rating assessment. Ordinal numbers come to complete difference with cardinal 
numbers which can be considered as actual numerical values that a variable might 
have with equal differences between them. Examples of such numbers can be the 
price of a share or a building whose differences in values can be interpreted as twice 
as good or bad (Brooks, 2008).  
The use of OLS technique assumes that the underlying dependent variables, the 
credit ratings, have been categorized into equally spaced discrete intervals rating 
categories. In this way, it is implied that the risk differential between an A+/A1 and 
an A/A2 rating is the same as between BB+/Ba1 and BB/Ba2 rating. In simple terms, 
it can be explained as follows. If the values of the dependent variable are matched to 
prices of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, then the linear regression interprets the difference between the 
value of 4 and the value of 3 as being the same as the difference between a value of 3 
and a value of 2. However, this is not valid since a rating of A+/A1 includes different 
information as compared to a rating of A/A2. The only remark to be made for sure is 
that as the value increases, there is a constant increase in the credit quality 
(Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Treepongkaruna, 2011). Thus, the use of OLS method is 
argued to be an inapplicable one for certain multivariate regression models, which are 
naturally ordered, such as credit ratings (Brooks, 2008). As a result, an ordered 
response model is being used in order to apply a regression model to the credit rating, 
which serves as the dependent variable in this study.  
This study summarizes and examines a sample data of five European countries 
(PIIGS) which have severely suffered from the global financial crisis and are heavily 
indebted. In order to provide a grater sample of observations for the econometric 
analysis, all ratings are taken into account that a bank might have received during a 
particular year as well as the corresponding figures of the variables for the previous 
year, i.e. for a bank rating received on 15
th
 May 2005, 18
th
 September 2005 and 10
th
 
November 2005, the bank ratios of 2004 were used (Caporale et al., 2012). The 
ratings for the banks of these countries, provided by Standard and Poor’s (or Moody’s 
and Fitch in some cases of unavailable data of the S&P long-term issuer rating) over 
the period of time studied, are replaced by a numerical equivalent grade into all the 
individual categories (AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, etc.) which provides a rating 1-21 
category as follows. 
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Table 2: Agencies rating and grading scale 
Standard and Poor’s Long 
Term Issuer Rating 
Moody’s Long Term 
Issuer Rating 
Fitch’s Long Term 
Issuer Rating 
Rating 
Grade 
AAA Aaa AAA 1 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 2 
AA Aa2 AA 3 
AA- Aa3 AA- 4 
A+ A1 A+ 5 
A A2 A 6 
A- A3 A- 7 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 8 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 10 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 11 
BB Ba2 BB 12 
BB- Ba3 BB- 13 
B+ B1 B+ 14 
B B2 B 15 
B- B3 B- 16 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 17 
CCC Caa2 CCC 18 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 19 
CC Ca CC 20 
C Ca C 21 
SD or D C SD or D - 
 
In order to interpret and apply the ordered response model, the latent variable 
model should be considered. 
  
         
 
  
   is an unobservable latent variable that measures the risk level,    is a vector 
of independent variables,   is a vector of unknown coefficients and    is a random 
disturbance term. If the distribution of the disturbance term is chosen to be normal, 
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then ultimately this produces an ordered probit model;  
 , the unobserved variable, is 
related to the observed variable, which in this study is the long-term issuer rating 
provided by the S&P’s in the following way. 
 
          
     
             
     
             
     
             
     
  
               
  
 
                         are unknown, threshold parameters to be 
estimated (Boes and Winkelmann, 2006). 
3.2 Regression model 
Having explained the theoretical framework of the regression model to be used, 
the model form for the banks of the countries of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain is as follows  
 
      
                    
           
    
                             
                    
    
                          
           
             
                        
                            
 
Finally, after having concluded to the regression model, tests and equations are 
ran in the econometrics software of EViews in order to test and check on the 
relationship of the independent variables with the dependent one and decide on which 
actually play the most significant role on affecting and determining the final credit 
rating assessments. All independent variables chosen as potential explanatory ones of 
the dependent variable of the credit rating do not necessarily indicate any significance 
on their own. An examination of their correlation is performed, using the correlation 
matrix method, for instance, as a vital step in order to decide on statistically 
significant variables that would potentially explain for the credit rating. Several 
regressions are then run with alternative independent variables’ mixes so as to 
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conclude to the final one that would best and most appropriately explain the examined 
dependent variable or, if not possible, comments to be made on all results 
accordingly.  
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4. Data Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Interpretation of data sample  
Credit rating agencies, according to their methodologies and rating process, 
indicate a variety of criteria and determinants for assigning bank credit ratings. 
However, it is extremely unlikely to use the same criteria for several reasons. Rating 
agencies provide little information on the relative weight assigned to each of the 
independent variables. Moreover, the choice of the variables indicates that data were 
available for each of the banks due to the large amount of available resources and 
databases an organization, such as Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s, can have at their 
disposal. This analysis, which is based on a number of limited databases and mainly 
internet available resources, surely meets across several limitations and lacks in its 
search and gathering of banks and ratings historical data. Key bank ratios or rating 
assignments were not available for all banks or years of examination resulting in a 
smaller sample and less observations, but still enough so as to conclude to results.  
This study focuses on the long-term debt ratings provided by the Standard and 
Poor’s for the banks of the five European countries, widely known in finance as 
PIIGS. The similar economic environments of these countries and the fact that they 
are heavily indebted support the examination of them as a group. These ratings cover 
a wide period of time, but only the period of 2004 to 2011 is studied, in terms of 
covering a time analysis before and after the 2008 financial crisis. Data for this part of 
the study was mainly taken from the Thomson1 database, since it provides 
information on different types of ratings for an adequate number of banks. In cases of 
non-available data for the long-term issuer rating of S&P, the equivalent counterpart 
in Moody’s and Fitch rating scale was used as presented in Table 2 of previous 
section. 
The initial sample of banks for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain was 57 
banks as shown in the available databases. The data was then discarded to ensure that 
the ratings across the agencies and the long-term issuer rating category were 
available, while a check was also performed on availability of bank-specific 
characteristics regarding the observed independent variables for the time studied. As a 
result, the final sample of banks for which ratings across the ratings agencies and 
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information from balance sheets and other bank characteristics were available 
includes 38 banks for the time period examined.   
Moreover, an important aspect of this study that has to be presented is a 
descriptive analysis of the bank-specific characteristics used as independent variables 
in the ordered response model. General instructions provided by the rating agencies 
for the assessment of credit ratings include some of the major bank specific elements: 
the competitive and regulatory environment, management and strategy, funding and 
liquidity, financial leverage, capital adequacy, earnings sources and risk management. 
The assessment includes both qualitative and quantitative criteria that should be taken 
into consideration (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Treepongkaruna, 2011). However, in 
this study, as mentioned earlier, there is a restriction in examining only quantitative 
factors, since qualitative data is a difficult task to quantify. As a result, the 
determinants of the ratings focus on financial variables regarding the balance sheet, 
operating performance and key bank ratios. Macroeconomic variables, such as 
inflation and gross domestic product (GDP), considered being rather insignificant in 
credit rating estimation as already mentioned in literature, are not a part of this 
analysis. Balance sheet elements and key bank ratios indicate major characteristics 
managed by banks regarding their operating, investing and financing needs. These 
include credit risk, liquidity, capital adequacy, profitability performance and size. All 
the data and figures regarding this part of the study were downloaded from 
Bloomberg. 
As banks have very different operating structures than regular industrial 
companies, it appears reasonable for investors to have a different set of fundamental 
factors to consider when evaluating banks. Except for the typical performance ratios, 
such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) providing significant 
information for all types of industries, specific alternative ratios are being preferred in 
the banking sector examining certain aspects. 
4.2 Descriptive analysis of variables 
 Credit quality (risk): A significant risk, which is of vital importance to banks, 
is related to the quality of its assets, specifically its loan assets.  The importance of 
credit quality indicators is somehow self-explanatory. If a bank's credit quality is 
deteriorating due to non-performing loans and assets, the bank's earnings and capital 
may be at risk. A non-performing loan is a loan where payments of interest or 
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principal are overdue by 90 days or more. In this study, the non-performing loans to 
total assets ratio is used as an indicator of the historical performance of a bank’s credit 
portfolio. Moreover, the loan and losses reserves to non-performing loans ratio is also 
taken into account as a factor of a bank’s credit risk. Loan loss reserves are 
accounting entries, which banks create to cover estimated losses on loans due to 
defaults and nonpayment. Loan loss reserves are useful information for analysts and 
investors because they indicate a bank's perception of the stability of its lending base. 
It is important to comment on the fact that banks are flexible when it comes to 
deciding on how much of a loan to write off and when, making comparisons among 
banks difficult. Loan loss reserves are revised quarterly. An increase in the balance is 
called a loan loss provision. A decrease in the balance is called a net charge-off. 
 Operating margin: A bank's efficiency ratio is essentially equivalent to a 
regular company's operating margin, in the sense that it measures how much the bank 
pays on operating expenses, like marketing and salaries. This study includes the 
efficiency ratio as a standard way to analyze how well a company or bank uses its 
assets and liabilities internally. Efficiency ratios are important because an 
improvement in the ratios usually indicates improved profitability.  
 Liquidity: The loan/deposit ratio is a commonly used statistic for assessing a 
bank's liquidity by dividing the banks total loans by its total deposits. This number, 
also known as the LTD ratio, is expressed as a percentage, estimates a bank's 
liquidity, and by extension, the aggressiveness of the bank's management. If the 
loan/deposit ratio is too high, the bank could be vulnerable to any unexpected severe 
changes in its deposit base, whereas if the loan/deposit ratio is too low, the bank is 
stuck with unproductive capital and earning less than it could.  
 Capital adequacy: There are a lot of ratios that bank regulators and investors 
use to assess the level to which the bank is vulnerable to a sudden increase in bad 
loans and the riskiness of a bank's balance sheet. The capital adequacy ratio, 
examined in this study, is expressed as a percentage of a bank's risk weighted credit 
exposures. This ratio is used to protect depositors and promote the stability and 
efficiency of financial systems around the world. Two types of capital are measured: 
tier one capital, which can absorb losses without a bank having the obligation to stop 
trading, and tier two capital, which can absorb losses in the case of a winding-up and 
as a result provides a lower level of protection to depositors. Despite not being a 
particularly popular ratio before the 2008 financial crisis, it does offer an adequate 
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estimation of the level of loss a bank can withstand, before turning into shareholder 
equity. Capital ratios can be thought of as proxies for a bank's error margin. 
Nowadays, capital ratios also play a larger role in determining whether regulatory 
unions will agree on acquisitions and dividend payments. 
 Size: Total assets are everything that a company or an individual owns. Total 
assets measure the financial size of a company or corporation. For a company, total 
assets are listed on a balance sheet. These assets are valued based on their purchase 
prices, not the current market value of them. Assets can easily be transformed from a 
physical item into cash. The state, in which an asset can be turned into money, is 
widely known as liquidity. Assets can take several forms, ranging from real estate and 
investment securities to property, equipment or inventory. Cash is also included in the 
sum of assets. In this study, the logarithm of total assets is taken into account in the 
econometric analysis, a technique commonly being used and providing a significant 
factor in most financial and statistical models. 
 Profitability:   Return on equity (ROE) is widely considered as the net income 
to equity ratio, while return on assets (ROA) as the net income to average assets one. 
ROE usually indicates how efficiently a company is exploiting its equity or capital. It 
has become the most popular and widespread indicator for several reasons; in 
specific, the most preferred measure at larger banks. The main reason for the growing 
popularity of ROE is clearly its independence from total assets. ROE can be applied 
to any section of business or product. ROA tends to inform on how effectively an 
organization is making good use of its base of assets.  This used to be the most 
popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to control and monitor 
their own performance from time to time. Many banks and bank executives still prefer 
to use ROA, though commonly at the smaller banks regarding the matter of asset size. 
Having conducted a necessary theoretical approach on the independent 
variables, a descriptive analysis and explanation of the econometric results is 
presented regarding the explained variable of the credit ratings and the explanatory 
variables of bank-specific characteristics. As mentioned before, underlying the 
observed alphabetic grade for a bank, there is an unobserved numerical score   
 . The 
value of this numerical score (grading scale of 1-21) is determined by the set of 
explanatory variables according to the regression model. 
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4.3 Correlation of independent variables  
Having concluded to the independent variables to be tested, a correlation test is 
run in order to test for potential multicollinearity among them. In the world of finance, 
correlation is a statistical measure of how two securities move in relation to each 
other. Correlation is used in advanced portfolio management. When dealing with a 
regression model instead, the term multicollinearity is also met referring to the 
correlation of explanatory variables between them. In statistics, multicollinearity 
is the occurrence of several independent variables in a multiple regression model that 
are closely correlated to one another. Multicollinearity or simple correlation can be 
the reason of wrong or unjustified results when studying the level of significance of 
independent variables trying to explain the dependent one (Brooks, 2008). 
The number of several explanatory variables in the ordered probit model 
amplifies the probability of multicollinearity. However, the estimation of their 
correlation as shown in the correlation matrix (Table 4) is not significantly high 
except for the variables in the same categories, such as the return on equity and assets 
(profitability measures). An interesting showing of the correlation matrix includes 
also the negative correlation of both ROE and ROA with the non-performing loans to 
total assets ratio. The correlation of the independent variables is not high in this 
econometric study. A sufficient number of non-correlated variables exist in order to 
proceed to the regression model to be run. The three variables that present values of 
perfect positive or negative correlation (ROE, ROA and non-performing loans to total 
assets ratio) are not included with the rest in one plain regression.  
4.4 Estimated regression models  
As a result, a couple of regressions are run, including a different mix of 
explanatory variables. The first regression run by the econometrics software of 
EViews includes all the considered variables of the general model, apart from the 
profitability ratios of return on equity and assets due to their correlation with the non-
performing loans to total assets ratio. The corresponding equation is as follows 
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Table 5 (see Appendix) shows which of the explanatory are significant or not so 
as to conclude to the ones that actually play an important role in credit rating and can 
be considered as significant quantitative determinants of the credit ratings 
assessments. According to the z-statistic and the probability values, estimated in the 
econometric software of EViews, non-performing loans to total assets, reserves for 
loans and losses to non-performing loans, efficiency ratio and total assets prove to be 
significant with values above the assumed levels of significance. As a result, the bank 
characteristics of credit risk and size, having been described in previous section for 
their role in banks’ performance and operations, can be considered as important 
aspects regarding credit rating determinants. As expected, there is a positive 
relationship between the non-performing loans and the credit ratings, shown by the 
positive coefficient of the variable. As non-performing loans increase, so does the 
numerical grade of the rating (the actual credit rating assessment is lower). On the 
other hand, reserves for loans and losses and total assets follow a different direction as 
shown by the negative relationship with the credit rating. As these two variables 
increase, the credit grade decreases (the actual rating assessment is higher). As far as 
the rest of the variables are concerned, capital adequacy ratio and loans to deposits 
ratio do not seem to play an important role in affecting credit rating evaluations. The 
statistical values of their estimation don’t show any significance at all levels of 
confidence. Capital adequacy and liquidity do not seem to be standard parameters of 
rating assessment for all the agencies. As examined in the literature section, these two 
characteristics are either neglected or not taken into account for all the types of rating 
that an agency provides. Fitch doesn’t consider capital adequacy an important 
determinant, while liquidity is probably significant for some the several kind of 
ratings assigned (Caporale et al., 2012). 
The exact equation for the second regression run is as follows 
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This alternative choice of independent variables excluded non-performing loans 
to total assets ratio and ROA, but included ROE as a profitability parameter in the 
credit rating assessment. As seen in Table 6 (see Appendix), reserves for loans and 
losses, efficiency ratio and total assets present once more significant values in their 
estimates of significance making us conclude to their important nature regarding the 
rating process. The new included variable, ROE, also appears to be quite significant, 
according to the showings of the regression output. The negative relationship to the 
dependent variable is justified, since the decrease of an entity’s profitability, a bank’s 
in specific, causes the increase of the credit grading in the model and as a result, the 
lowering of the actual rating. Similarly to the previous variable choice, capital 
adequacy and loans to deposits ratio do not prove to be significant, as the regression 
output indicates. 
The third and final choice of variables appears in the following equation  
 
      
                        
                    
                              
           
              
                                              
  
This particular mix of explanatory variables excludes once again the non-
performing loan parameter and replaces the return on equity variable with the return 
on asset one. The interesting point of the regression output, demonstrated in Table 7 
(see Appendix), concentrates on the insignificance of the efficiency ratio, despite the 
significant appearance of reserves for loans and losses and total assets for the third 
equation once again. The profitability ratio, ROA in particular, proves to be quite 
significant according to the showings of the probability value and z-statistic, 
following the same interpretation as the ROE variable regarding profitability and its 
impact on the rating process. Similarly to both of the previous regressions run, capital 
adequacy and loans to deposits ratio aren’t significant, enabling a conclusion of 
certainty of their unimportance as aspects in determining banks’ credit ratings. 
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To sum up, the regression outputs of the three alternative models, applied for 
the explanation of the dependent variable of credit rating, definitely agree on the 
significance of reserves for loans and losses and total assets in explaining the 
dependent variable of credit rating. Credit risk and size, as bank-specific 
characteristics, appear to be important determinants in bank credit rating from the 
rating agencies’ perspective. Profitability ratios, presented in the form of return on 
equity and assets, prove themselves also to be significant determinants of bank credit 
ratings despite their correlation when tested in relation to non-performing loans. 
Moreover, efficiency appears to be an important aspect in the bank rating process, as 
shown by the outputs of two of the regressions estimated. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study constitutes an examination of the hotly debated issue of credit rating 
agencies and an effort to provide information on an area in finance that is quite 
unknown to the public. Credit rating agencies play an important role in financial 
markets for a long period of time, but until recently their operating procedures as 
organizations and true character were only familiar to people in finance. The recent 
financial recession has brought them to light and provoked a lot of controversy 
regarding their value and credibility as plain financial and statistical organizations 
providing assessments on the credit risk of nations, banks and other financial 
instruments.   
A brief and comprehensive theoretical approach is firstly attempted on their 
historical background, their functions and evolving role through the last century in 
order to provide a presentation of their growing and evolution from simple statistical 
organizations to financial giants affecting global economy and, as many experts 
believe, significantly contributing to the crisis due to irresponsibility and lack of 
creditworthiness. Secondly, an examination and analysis of the quantitative 
determinants of credit ratings is conducted, based on the banks of five European 
countries, widely known in the world of finance as PIIGS. The similar socioeconomic 
environments of these countries and financial losses they have succumbed to due to 
the 2008 crisis have inspired the effort to examine their bank’s ratings.  Quantitative 
determinants include only bank-specific characteristics, such as credit risk, liquidity, 
profitability, efficiency and capital adequacy, whereas qualitative criteria, such as 
ownership structure, management strategy, regulations and risk management are also 
applied by agencies in their assessments and credit risk evaluations (Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick and Treepongkaruna, 2011). The fact that such kind of information is hard 
to quantify makes it difficult for a research to take them into account and as a result is 
not a part of this econometric study, causing a certain limited area of research and not 
enough space for integrated conclusions about the credit rating procedures. Such a 
research would be a further step of a similar econometric study in order to conclude to 
a more descriptive and circumstantial image of the actual rating procedures and 
methodologies of rating agencies.  
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As far as the evolution of rating agencies is concerned, it seems reasonable for a 
simple statistical company to transform to an international financial organization, 
considering all the changes that have happened during the last century. The key 
function of these agencies was initially the information provided to investors on 
investment grade bonds and other financial instruments and the credit risk assessment 
of issuers of debt since the shift from investor-pays model to issuer-pays one. Both 
kind of information are of crucial importance to financial players and markets, since 
the whole game of financial investments and decisions is based on reliable 
information and creditworthiness. The players, from simple investors to large 
financial and investment corporations, are eager to pay for this information. Agencies, 
on their behalf, were smart enough, obviously, to realize the power they possessed, 
affecting and controlling the decision making of everyone with their assessments. As 
a result, these transactions of services and economic rewards for the services ended in 
the evolving role of the agencies, the conflicts of interest among several parties and 
the need for regulatory and supervisory interference of independent bodies to restore 
the potential mess created. In a situation, where governments, financial institutions 
and rating agencies interacted, while taking care of their personal interests, it is 
reasonable for the rating agencies to affect the global economy with their credit risk 
opinions. 
Certain conclusions are also reached, regarding the quantitative section of the 
study and the determinants of bank credit rating. Credit risk or asset quality is an 
important aspect of banks that rating agencies take into account in the credit rating 
process. Non-performing loans and loan loss provision are significant bank-specific 
characteristics affecting the rating assessments, providing an alternative and 
differential picture of the banking sector compared to other industries. Moreover, the 
size of the banks, expressed in pure assets possessed by a financial institution, plays 
an important role in the whole procedure, while profitability also pays its share in the 
credit rating methodology. Returns, expressed either in the form of equity or assets, 
definitely prove themselves to be crucial factors. Finally, efficiency is also 
contributing to the credit rating process in the terms of a bank’s internal handling of 
assets and liabilities. Usually, efficiency comes improved profitability; both 
contributing as seen in the determining of rating criteria.  
The interesting finding of the study concentrates on the non-significance of 
capital adequacy and liquidity. Previous research on these two aspects, as examined in 
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literature, provides also questionable results regarding their significance in the matter. 
They don’t seem to be a standard case in the agencies’ evaluations regarding all the 
different types of ratings. Each agency and each type of rating provided by them, from 
long to short-term or domestic to foreign, uses alternative criteria in the included 
assumptions, methodologies and applications. This remark on the study’s showings 
constitutes a point of potential further investigation on liquidity and capital adequacy, 
as aspects of the credit rating process. Other ratios expressing the two variables might 
prove to be significant; more types of ratings could also be examined or certain 
country elements could be used related to the aspects of liquidity and capital 
adequacy. Macroeconomic variables of inflation and GDP were neglected due to the 
examined literature, but other figures and variables could be tested for correlation 
with the bank-specific characteristics and explanation of the examined variable of 
credit rating. Limited available resources and unavailable data from the databases at 
the studier’s disposal crossed certain limitations regarding the previous aspects of 
potential investigation in the future. 
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7. Appendix 
Table 3: List of independent variables 
Symbol Definition 
   Non-performing loans/Total Assets 
   Reserves for loans and losses/Non-
performing loans 
   Capital Adequacy Ratio 
   Total Loans/Total Deposits 
   Efficiency Ratio 
   ROE(Return on Equity) 
   ROA(Return on Assets) 
   Total Assets(Log) 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
NPLS_TO_T
OTAL_ASSE
TS 
RESERVE_L
OAN_LOSSE
S_TO_N 
CAPITAL_A
DEQUACY_R
ATIO 
TOT_LOAN_
TO_TOT_DP
ST 
EFF_RATIO 
RETURN_CO
M_EQY 
RETURN_ON
_ASSET 
BS_TOT_ASS
ET 
NPLS_TO_T
OTAL_ASSE
TS 
1.000000        
RESERVE_L
OAN_LOSSE
S_TO_N 
-0.276630 1.000000       
CAPITAL_A
DEQUACY_
RATI 
-0.059380 -0.054944 1.000000      
TOT_LOAN_
TO_TOT_DP
ST 
0.143922 0.108407 0.084765 1.000000     
EFF_RATIO 0.271212 -0.034452 -0.365085 -0.126794 1.000000    
RETURN_CO
M_EQY 
-0.889812 0.076578 0.163014 -0.141506 -0.431700 1.000000   
RETURN_O
N_ASSET 
-0.903082 0.112244 0.150193 -0.147571 -0.479539 0.990296 1.000000  
BS_TOT_AS
SET 
-0.171072 -0.094002 0.216638 0.198257 -0.531367 0.303961 0.303963 1.000000 
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Table 5: Regression Output (1) 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT_RATING  
Method: ML - Ordered Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1-215   
Included Observations: 169   
Number of ordered indicator values: 15  
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistic Prob. 
NPLS_TO_TOTAL_ASSETS 7.855403 2.157650 3.640721 0.0003 
RESERVE_LOAN_LOSSES_TO_N -0.624083 0.110678 -5.638714 0.0000 
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY_RATIO 1.446687 4.013136 0.360488 0.7185 
TOT_LOAN_TO_TOT_DPST -0.246887 0.194269 -1.270852 0.2038 
EFF_RATIO 1.191068 0.347501 3.427522 0.0006 
BS_TOT_ASSET -0.294308 0.058473 -5.033193 0.0000 
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Table 6: Regression Output (2) 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT_RATING  
Method: ML - Ordered Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1-215   
Included Observations: 169   
Number of ordered indicator values: 15  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistic Prob. 
RESERVE_LOAN_LOSSES_TO_N -0.748364 0.112435 -6.655964 0.0000 
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY_RATIO 1.985649 4.238871 0.468438 0.6395 
TOT_LOAN_TO_TOT_DPST -0.251882 0.188387 -1.337045 0.1812 
EFF_RATIO 0.731993 0.385593 1.898355 0.0576 
RETURN_COM_EQY -0.951410 0.343782 -2.767478 0.0056 
BS_TOT_ASSET -0.275651 0.060115 -4.585431 0.0000 
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Table 7: Regression Output (3) 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT_RATING  
Method: ML - Ordered Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1-215   
Included Observations: 169   
Number of ordered indicator values: 15  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error Z-statistic Prob. 
RESERVE_LOAN_LOSSES_TO_N -0.724193 0.113561 -6.377107 0.0000 
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY_RATIO 1.238618 4.245268 0.291764 0.7705 
TOT_LOAN_TO_TOT_DPST -0.292223 0.193138 -1.513024 0.1303 
EFF_RATIO 0.501601 0.422114 1.188306 0.2347 
RETURN_ON_ASSET -26.34510 8.648816 -3.046093 0.0023 
BS_TOT_ASSET -0.287146 0.059376 -4.836030 0.0000 
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Table 8: Summary of variables significance for estimated regressions 
 Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3) 
Non-performing 
loans/Total Assets 
0.0003 
(3.647201)*** 
  
Reserves for loans 
and losses/Non-
performing loans 
0.0000 
(-5.638714)*** 
0.0000 
(-6.377107)*** 
0.0000 
(-6.377107)*** 
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
0.7185 
(0.360488) 
0.7705 
(0.468438) 
0.7705 
(0.291764) 
Total Loans/Total 
Deposits 
0.2038 
(-1.270852) 
0.1812 
(-1.337045) 
0.1303 
(-1.513024) 
Efficiency Ratio 
0.0006 
(3.427522)*** 
0.0576 
(1.898355)* 
0.2347 
(1.188306) 
ROE(Return on 
Equity) 
 
0.0056 
(-2.767478)*** 
 
ROA(Return on 
Assets) 
  
0.0023 
(-3.046093)*** 
Total Assets(Log) 
0.0000 
(-5.033193)*** 
0.0000 
(-4.585431)*** 
0.0000 
(-4.836030)*** 
(Probability values for each variable; values in parenthesis indicate z-statistic; * denotes significance at 10% 
level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; ***denotes significance at 1% level) 
 
